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POINT I
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS BY DOPL
A. Lack of Factual Foundation Makes Various Statements
and Arguments by DOPL Irrelevant
DOPL correctly states that Hodsen is not licensed as a dietician in the State
of Utah.1 However, this statement is legally irrelevant because certification (rather
than licensure) of dieticians in Utah is only necessary for those who use the initials
"CD." or "D." In both the original and present DOPL proceedings, there is no
evidence that Hodsen has ever used the initials "CD." or "D."; hence, the question
of certification under the Dietician Certification Act is not relevant.2
DOPL correctly states that Judge Eves previously found that the exchange
of information between Hodsen and Anderson constituted "diagnosis".3 The UMPA
prohibition applicable at this time to Hodsen and Anderson only prohibits
"diagnosis"; DOPL did not place in the stipulated facts presented to Judge
Shumate, nor raise in the arguments before Judge Shumate, that the prohibited
conduct of Hodsen was more than "diagnosis". Nonetheless, DOPL's present legal
argument claims that Hodsen's conduct "included the actual diagnosis of and

1

DOPL Brief at 5.

2

See U.C.A. § 58-49-1 et. seq.

3

U.C.A § 58-67-102(4)(d).
1

prescription of treatment for specific human ailments and medical considerations
for monetary consideration."4

DOPL's later citation of legal precedent that

addresses prohibitions on medical "treatment" or "procedure" is a continuation of
DOPL's erroneous reliance on the existence of facts or prohibitions beyond the
limited aspect of "diagnosis" relying on truthful and non-misleading information.5
Furthermore, no factual stipulations or findings have been made as to
monetary consideration involved in the "diagnosis" that occurs when Hodsen uses
truthful and non-misleading information provided by Anderson when he gives
truthful and non-misleading advice to Anderson. Even if Hodsen's compensation
were assumed to be based on the sale to Anderson of the recommended herb or
other product of nature, it was specifically stipulated that Anderson (or any other
customer) need not purchase any of the product from Hodsen.6
Thus, these legal arguments are irrelevant because they are without factual
foundation.

4

DOPLBriefat17.
5

See U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d). Furthermore, the statutory exemption for those
involved in the "sale of vitamins, health foods, dietary supplements, herbs or other products
of nature, the sale of which is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law" is only
limited by those who "diagnose" a condition; to "treat, correct, or prescribe" or "advise"
(deleted from the definition of the practice of medicine in 1996) is exempted from licensure.
6

See Agreed Statement of Undisputed Facts H 23; Record at 283.
2

B. Ignoring Factual Stipulations Regarding Hodsen and Anderson
Does Not Change Their Legal Relevance
The material facts of this case were established by stipulation and affidavit
of Anderson in the district court below . DOPL "objects to Hodsen's statement of
facts because it mixes stipulated facts with argument."7 This statement does not
justify ignoring facts that show varied conditions that may be constitutionally
significant in protecting the constitutional rights of Hodsen and Anderson.
For example, as it relates to Hodsen, DOPL has failed to (1) acknowledge
that the information provided to Hodsen can be "a written diagnosis by a licensed
health care provider indicating . . .a certain health condition," (2) that Hodsen
identifies what he "believes the nutritional needs of the person most likely are, and
determines what uncontrolled and lawful herbal or other products of nature would
likely contribute to satisfying those needs," and (3) that Hodsen may or may not
disclose the rationale for the advice that he gives to the recipient of his advice.8
As it relates to Anderson, DOPL has failed to acknowledge that (1)
Anderson's health condition had not responded to conventional medical treatment,
(2) Anderson consulted with Hodsen when DOPL had determined he was exempt
from licensure, (3) her condition has become manageable and her quality of life has

7

DOPL Brief at 5 n. 1.

8

R. at 282-283; Hodsen and Anderson's Opening Brief at 10-11.
3

vastly improved, (4) Anderson is and has been under the care of a licensed
physician and acupuncturist, (5) Anderson desires the advice or information from
Hodsen to formulate her religious beliefs regarding the use of wholesome herbs
and other products of nature "with prudence and thanksgiving"9 and receive both
physical and spiritual blessings by her exercise of this belief, and (6) her inability to
receive the information essential to her formulation of belief and exercise has
damaged her physically, spiritually, and diminished her quality of life.10
These factual omissions are legally significant in both state and federal
constitutional analysis addressing the validity of DOPL's need to protect the "public
health" as applied to Hodsen and Anderson, the significance of the 1996 deletion
of the word "advise" from the definition of "practice of medicine," and the nature of
the religious belief that Anderson desires to form and exercise.
C. Any "Legal Argument" in the Statement of Facts of Hodsen
Can Be Clarified on Reply as "Fact" or "Law"
Hodsen and Anderson included in their Statement of Facts an explanation
of how their exchange of truthful and non-misleading information was prohibited
under the definitions of "diagnose" and the "practice of medicine."11 Hodsen and

9

Doctrine and Covenants 89:11.

10

See references to the Record in Hodsen and Anderson's Opening Brief at 8, 11 -14.

11

See Opening Brief of Hodsen and Anderson at 8-12.
4

Anderson believed such an explanation was a necessary inference of the stipulated
facts, e.g. to show why after 1996 their previously lawful conduct now exposed them
to criminal and civil prosecution. To the degree that this explanation was not
properly stated as facts, Hodsen and Anderson request that this portion of the
disputed "facts" be recognized as an legal explanation of how the exchange of
truthful and non-misleading information by Hodsen and Anderson in this case
violates the statutory provisions prohibiting a person to "diagnose" when marketing
lawful herbs and other products of nature, and incorporate the same in this brief.
POINT II
AS APPLIED TO HODSEN AND ANDERSON, UMPA IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY
COMPELLING INTERESTS AND IS OVERBROAD
In determining whether the State may act to override an individual's freedom
to reject government's paternalistic protection, a balancing of the necessity of the
State's interest for the public good must be weighed against the importance of the
individual's rights as recognized in express constitutional texts. Generic exercise
of governmental power is restricted when it infringes upon or impedes the individual
exercise of inherent and inalienable, or fundamental rights.

5

A. As Applied, UMPA is Not Justified By
a "Compelling" Governmental Interest
Hodsen and Anderson do not dispute that Utah Supreme Court opinions
have assumed that the State of Utah has a basic interest in generally regulating the
practice of medicine for the benefit of the public.

Both parties have quoted

language from Utah Supreme Court cases recognizing that interest. However,
notwithstanding DOPL's characterization in their brief of this interest as being
"compelling," there is no Utah appellate court precedent that specifically identifies
this interest as being on par with those that have been labeled as being classified
as being "compelling."
"A compelling state interest is a 'paramount' interest, one of 'the highest
order.'"12 Various opinions of the Utah Supreme Court have identified situations
when the State of Utah has compelling interests. Some compelling interests focus
on ensuring certain rights of citizens are protected. For example, because of the
rights protected by Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution, "[t]he State has a
compelling interest in insuring that all parties are able to resolve legal disputes
before a neutral tribunal. . .keeping the courts open."13 Others are based on the
exercise of governmental power specifically referred to in the constitutional text.

12

Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1250 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted.)

13

id. at 1250-1251.
6

For example, it is not surprising that the power to tax has been recognized as being
a "compelling interest."14 Finally, there has been judicial recognition of situations
when the Legislature has identified certain interests as being "compelling."15
However, unlike these identified interests, the regulatory practice of medicine has
not been specifically recognized by Utah appellate courts as being "compelling," or
a state interest identified as such by either a specific constitutional provision
mandating the same or specific determinations by the Legislature that an interest
reflected in laws of general application (without exceptions) was a "compelling"
governmental interest.
B. As Applied to Hodsen and Anderson, UMPA Is Overbroad
The statutory authority DOPL is relying on to regulate the truthful and nonmisleading conduct of Hodsen and Anderson is overbroad.
Statutory overbreadth. . .is a substantive due process question which
addresses the issue of whether 'the statute in question is so broad that
it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit
constitutionally protected activity as well.'16

14

Marbov v. Utah State Tax Commission, 904 P.2d 662, 669 (Utah 1995).

15

J.M., N.P., and R.S. v. State of Utah, 940 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah App. 1997) citing
U.C.A. § 78-30-4.12(2)(a) ("The state has a compelling interest in providing a stable and
permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner".)
16

Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1268
(Utah 1997) (citations omitted.)
7

In time of conflict, "[t]he less a right is protected the lower the threshold for state
regulation, while the more the right deserves protection, the more compelling the
state's interest must be to merit interference."17 Hodsen and Anderson have relied
on specific provisions of the Utah or United States Constitutions that protect private
or religious speech, commercial speech, or part of Anderson's formulation of
religious belief, free exercise of religious practice, and exercise of personal,
physical autonomy.18 When the right asserted is expressly protected by the text of
the Utah Constitution, "the more compelling the state's interest must be to merit
interference." A general reliance on a need to protect public health is insufficient
to constitute a "compelling interest" of significant enough magnitude to prevent two
competent adults from formulating religious belief and practice through the truthful
and non-misleading private or commercial speech regarding herbs and other
products of nature that are lawfully sold in the marketplace.

17

Elks Lodge #719 and # 2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control. 905
P.2d 1189, 1195 (Utah 1995), cert, denied 517 U.S. 1221, 116S.Ct. 1850, 134L.Ed.2d
950(1996).
18

Anderson's position on appeal to a right of personal autonomy and bodily integrity has
been grounded on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process precedent recognizing
the same.
8

POINT III
LEGAL PRECEDENT CITED BY DOPL DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE
PROHIBITING OF EXCHANGE OF TRUTHFUL INFORMATION
DOPL has claimed that Hodsen and Anderson have failed to properly
distinguish between state and federal constitutional claims.19

DOPL has also

discussed a 1985 concurring opinion by Justice Byron White of the United States
Supreme Court20 (which is not relevant to its other cited state or federal opinions)
to suggest a form of analysis that should be followed in this case. Both positions
are erroneous.
A. Hodsen and Anderson Have Properly Presented Different Analysis of
Protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions
Hodsen and Anderson have properly sought protection of their inherent and
inalienable rights of religion and speech under the Utah Constitution. Relevant, selfexecuting provisions of the Utah Constitution have been applied after determining
whether or not there is informative history provided by Utah's Constitutional
Convention, the text's plain language, comparable texts available from sister
jurisdictions, and the relevant constitutional texts as a whole. The express State
constitutional provisions relied upon are not found in the United States
19

DOPL Brief at 12-13.

20

Lowe v. Securities Exchange Commission, 472 U.S. 181,211, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 2573,
86 L.Ed.2d 130 (1985) (White, J., concurring in result).
9

Constitution.21 Seeking protection from state constitution provisions before turning
to federal protections allows for greater protection of inherent and inalienable rights
that have deep meaning in Utah's unique heritage and reaffirms important concepts
of comity and federalism.
Federal analysis of religious rights, regulation of private and public or
commercial speech, (a distinction not addressed in the text of the Utah Constitution
or Utah case law), suggests a different form of analysis than that suggested by
present interpretation of the Utah Constitution. Achieving a similar result — allowing
truthful and non-misleading expression — can be achieved by both even though the
form and nature of analysis could well be different.
B. The Precedent Relied Upon By DOPL to Justify UMPA Is
Not Relevant to the Facts of this Case
DOPL has asserted that a 1985 concurring opinion by Justice Byron White
and other state and federal decisions are instructive of the analysis that should be
applied in this case. This claim is erroneous as a matter of law and fact.
There are at least four reasons why this court should not follow the
suggestion by DOPL that the application of the UMPA to Hodsen and Anderson is

See Opening Brief of Hodsen and Anderson at 19-21 (religious freedoms).
10

justified by dicta in Justice Byron White's 1985 concurring opinion which explored
possible constitutional constraints associated with regulating the speech by one
who had previously engaged in illegal conduct regarding security laws. First, the
opinion is not binding on this court or any federal court.22 Second, Hoffman II was
decided by the Utah Supreme Court after the 1985 concurring opinion and made
no reference to it or engaged in any of the analysis contained in the same. Third,
none of the three state court opinions that were represented in DOPL's brief as
"adopting. . Justice Byron White's detailed First Amendment analysis"23 cite or
make reference to the concurring opinion or the main opinion; this is not surprising
since two of the three cases were decided before the 1985 opinion was issued.
Fourth, the Utah Supreme Court has already indicated a preference for Utah
constitutional analysis; therefore, is no need to begin with a federal analysis.24
Furthermore, the three opinions involved with regulating speech and
licensure that Hodsen and Anderson have located that followed Justice White's

DOPL concedes as much. See Brief of DOPL at 18 n. 10.
BriefofDOPLat18.
See West v. Thomson Newspaper. 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994).
11

analysis are also distinguishable. In 1992, the New York Court of Appeals opinion
in In re Rowe25 applied the opinion of Justice White to determine that a suspended
attorney's preparation of a law-related article for general reading and use of initials
J.D. after his name did not constitute the practice of law.26 This case is
distinguishable from that of Hodsen and Anderson because the conduct
complained of did not involve any particular client. In 1988, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Accountants' Society of Virginia v. Bowman,27 held that "the
restrictions imposed . . . on the use of certain terms in the work product of nonCPAs, amount to the permissible regulation of a profession, not an abridgement of
speech by the first amendment."28 This opinion prohibited certain speech engaged
in by the non-licensed persons; in this case the source of the communication that
is prohibited by UMPA arises from the speech of others, even if the speech is (1)
in writing from a licensed health care provider, (2) derived from government
approved, home-use testing equipment, (3) derived from a religiously based or
spiritual experience of the speaker, or (4) based on oral or written history provided
by the person. A 1988 in the opinion of the Louisiana Court of Appeals opinion in
25

80 N.Y.2d 336, 604 N.E.2d 728, 590 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1992).

26

Jd. at 342, id. at 741.

27

860 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1988).

28

Jd. at 604.
12

Accountants' Association of Louisiana v. State of Louisiana,29 forbade non-licensed
accountants from issuing "review" reports (which are less than audits but more than
simply information gathering) which stated they were "prepared in accordance with
established standards" rather than the phrase "in accordance with the standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants".

This

prohibition is distinguishable from this case because the providing of information by
a client to an unlicensed accountant was not forbidden nor his truthful and nonmisleading communication in return. The truthful and non-misleading information
provided by Hodsen does not claim or imply it is in accordance with the standards
of any organization of persons licensed by the State of Utah.
POINT IV
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS OF ANDERSON
ARE SPECIFICALLY VIOLATED BY UMPA
Anderson's religious beliefs regarding the use of herbs and other products
of nature with "prudence and thanksgiving" depend upon and find meaning and
enlargement in conjunction with the receipt of secular as well as Divinely inspired
information. Before the 1996 amendments to UMPA, Anderson had been allowed
to provide truthful and non-misleading information to Hodsen regarding herself and
29

533 So.2d 1251, 1254-1255 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied 538 So.2d 593 (La.
1989), cert, denied sub, nom. Louisiana Society of Independent Accountants v. Louisiana.
493 U.S. 813, 110 S.Ct. 60, 107 LEd.2d 28 (1989)
13

receive truthful and non-misleading information about herbs and other products of
nature from Hodsen. DOPL, Hodsen and Anderson knew that Hodsen was not
licensed as a physician but had graduated from medical school and thereafter
gained substantial education and experience regarding the beneficial uses of herbs
and other products of nature. Hodsen and Anderson believed Hodsen sought and
received Divine inspiration in providing suggestions to Anderson who was free to
purchase or not purchase lawful products from Hodsen. DOPL does not contest
that Anderson's beliefs are sincerely held or that as a result of the 1996
amendments,

Anderson is unable to share and receive information that has

harmed her, damaged her physically and spiritually, and diminished her quality of
life.

The State's prohibition of an exchange of information under these

circumstances is significantly different from the example given in DOPL's brief
regarding having an unlicensed driver drive a vehicle for another person.30 There
is no express constitutional right — much less an inherent and inalienable one —
to have or use a driver's license.31 Thus, DOPL's driver's license analogy is only

30

See DOPL Brief at 30.

31

Obviously such a right could not have been considered at the 1896 Constitutional
Convention before widespread use of automobiles, creation of roads, gasoline taxes, and
licensing requirements. No express text guarantees the right to drive on public roads.
14

relevant to those rights where "the less a right is protected, the lower threshold for
state regulation".32
On the other hand, an inherent and inalienable right to engage in truthful
speech to formulate religious belief and act thereon in accordance with one's
conscience has been assumed to exist from the founding of our nation. The Utah
constitution's guarantee of "[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment"33 and
assurance that "the rights of conscience shall not be infringed"34 are mandates that
this type of conduct merits constitutional protection from any infringement or
inhibition imposed by a lawfully constituted government except in the most exigent
circumstances. As these rights of Anderson and other prospective clients are
subject to specified protections provided in the Declaration of Rights in Utah's
constitution, examination of infringement upon or impediment to the exercise of
their rights is more analogous to those situations where "the more the right
deserves protection, the more compelling the state's interest must be to merit
interference."35
32

Elks Lodge #719 and # 2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, supra,

905P.2dat1195.
33

Utah Const., Art. I l l § 1 .

34

Utah Const., Art. I § 4.

35

Elks Lodge #719 and # 2021 (Moab) v.
905P.2dat1195.
15

of Alcoholic Bev. Control,

The legal authorities relied upon by DOPL to justify prohibiting the exchange
of truthful information are distinguishable from the facts and law applicable to this
case. The 1917 United States Supreme Court case Crane v. Johnson36 was
decided solely on the basis of an Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
challenge.

Since neither Hodsen nor Anderson have asserted this claim under

either the Utah of the United States Constitution, this precedent is irrelevant.
The 1917 case of People v. Voqelaesanq37 determined that an unlicensed
practitioner could not use a religious exemption to licensure when treatment
provided involved both spiritual components and application of temporal remedies.
This is distinguishable in two ways from this case. First, Hodsen has not asserted
that his conduct is protected by the traditional religious exemption of UMPA.38
(Because Hodsen has not done so, Anderson may not seek truthful information
from Hodsen regarding lawful products of nature unless Hodsen receives no truthful
information from her or anyone else regarding any condition of Anderson.) Second,
in the absence of diagnosis, UMPA does not require the licensure of those involved
in sale of herbs and other products of nature39 nor prohibit the exchange of truthful
36

242 U.S. 339, 37 S.Ct. 176, 61 L.Ed. 348 (1917).

37

221 N.Y. 290, 116 N.E. 977 (Ct.App. 1917).

38

See U.C.A. § 58-67-305(4).

39

See U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3)(a)(i).
16

and non-misleading information regarding herbs and other products of nature.40
Thus, both Hodsen's position and that of the State of Utah is contrary to the
decision of New York to narrowly limit a religious exemption to medical licensure as
applying solely to religious means and not religious and secular means.
The 1932 Washington Supreme Court opinion of Washington v. Verbon41 is
also distinguishable. In response to a contention that Verbon's religious freedom
was being violated, the Washington Court held
[t]he enforcement of reasonable and necessary regulations in the
practice of medicine, so commonly provided for under the statues of
the different states enacted under the general police power as
essential in the preservation of the public health and general welfare,
must not be taken to be violative of this provision of the constitution.42
These observations are distinguishable from this case for at least two reasons.
First, only three states presently define "diagnose" or "diagnosis" so that the
40

"Exemption from licensure is allowed for "a person acting in good faith for religious
reasons, as a matter of conscience, or based on personal belief, when obtaining or
providing any information regarding health care and the use of. . .[herbs or other products
of nature, which is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law]." U.C.A. § 58-67305(3)(a)(ii). This exemption, however, does "not allow a person to diagnose" or "prohibit
providing truthful and non-misleading information regarding any of the products under
Subsection 3a(i)." U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3)(b). Perhaps the tension between not prohibiting
truthful and non-misleading information regarding herbs, protecting access to information
about the same, and prohibiting diagnosis arose simply because of the failure of those
amending the legislation to recognize that Utah's unique definition of diagnosis included
solely reliance on information rather than the more tradition components that are also
included in the definition.
41

167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d 1083 (1932).

42

Jd. at 148-149, id at 1086.
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prohibited conduct may include only reliance on information supplied by another.
The three states are Indiana,43 Oregon,44 and Utah.45 Oregon effectively eliminates
the constitutional conflict present in this case because of a broad exemption stating
that
[njothing in this chapter interferes in any manner with an individual's
right to select the practitioner or mode of treatment of an individual's
choice, or interferes with the right of the person so employed to give
the treatment so chosen if public laws and rules are complied with.46
The 1932 rationale of the Washington Supreme Court presumed that the
"reasonable and necessary regulations in the practice of medicine, [are] commonly
provided for under the statues of the different states." Indiana is the sole state that
has upheld regulations similar to that of Utah.47 This minimal companion precedent
for the extreme position taken by the 1996 UMPA amendments is insufficient to
43

Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 25-22.5-1-1.1 (1998) ("It is not necessary that the
examination be made in the presence of the patient; it may be made on information
supplied either directly or indirectly by the patient.")
44

O.R.S. § 667.010 (1997) ("It is not necessary that the examination be made in the
presence of the patient; it may be made on information supplied either directly or indirectly
by the patient.")
45

U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d). ("[T]o make an examination or determination as described
in Subsection 4(a) upon or from information supplied directly or indirectly by another
person, whether or not in the presence of the person attempting the diagnosis or
examination.")
46

O.R.S. §677.060(6) (1997).

47

See Steina v. State ex. rel. Medical Licensing Board of Indiana, 513 N.E.2d 1234
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
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establish the assumption made by the Washington Court. Second, the provisions
of the Washington Constitution that guaranteed "absolute freedom of conscience
in all matters of religious sentiment, belief, and worship" were specifically limited by
an express provision disavowing any intent to "justify practices inconsistent with the
peace and safety of the state."48 Utah does not have such a generic provision.
Even if it did, the exemptions afforded under UMPA to truthful and non-misleading
speech or speech involving an exchange of information for religious or other deeply
held beliefs undermine any claim that the State has some compelling interest in
denying the liberties and freedoms Hodsen and Anderson desire to exercise.
The 1980 case of Rutherford vs. United States49 can be distinguished from
this case for at least two reasons. First, the case dealt with FDA marketing
requirements, not patient receipt of information.
It is apparent in the context with which we are here concerned that the
decision by the patient whether to have a treatment or not is a
protected right, but his selection of a particular treatment, or at least a
medication, is within the area of governmental interest in protecting
public health. The premarketing requirement of the Federal Good,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, is an exercise of
Congressional authority to limit the patient's choice of medication.50

48

Wash. Const, Art. | § 11.

49

616F.2d455(10 t h Cir. 1980) cert, denied 449 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 336, 66 LEd.2d
937(1980).
50

]d- at 457.
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Second, the limitation arose because of failure to follow federal procedures in
demonstrating pre-market safety, consistency, and validity of claims regarding
laetrile. In this case, the information provided deals with products that are in
conformity with state and federal law.
The 1990 federal district court case of Peckham v. Thompson,51 can be
distinguished from this case for at least two reasons. First, the opinion cites the
Rutherford precedent for the proposition that "there is no constitutional right to
select a particular treatment of procedure over the rational objections of
government."52 For reasons cited above, this authority is distinguishable. Second,
the district court opinion found the alleged licensing prohibitions as to midwifery
were too vague to enforce against midwives. Hodsen and Anderson's challenge
focuses on overbreadth not vagueness.
POINT V
THE PROHIBITION ON HODSEN'S PROPOSED MODIFIED USE OF "M.D."
UNJUSTIFIABLY INFRINGES ON HIS SPEECH RIGHTS
Hodsen has received a M.D. degree from U.C.L.A. Hodsen would like to use
this title on business cards and journal articles, adding a disclaimer that he is a

51

745 F. Supp. 1388 (C.D.C. III. 1990) remanded with instructions, 966 F.2d 295 (7th
Cir. 1992).
52

Id. citing Rutherford v. United States. 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) cert, denied
449 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 336, 66 LEd.2d 937 (1980).
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"Graduate of U.C.L.A. School of Medicine" and a "Research Biochemist not in
medical practice." DOPL interprets UMPA as prohibiting Hodsen's speech because
even with the added clarifications, Hodsen's use of the designation "M.D." after his
name "might cause a reasonable person to believe that Hodsen is a licensed
physician and that such use, in connection with Hodsen's business, may be
deceptive or misleading regarding Hodsen's status" in terms of licensure. This
concern is unjustified in this case for at least three reasons.
First, the use of the modified "M.D." designation in journal articles will not
confuse or mislead a "reasonable person" as to the licensure status of Hodsen. If
DOPL is correct is that Justice White's analysis has merit in regulating speech and
professional licensure, regulating Hodsen's speech in a journal article that is
designed for general rather than individual use violates the First Amendment.
Furthermore, since in Hodsen's case the use of the designation "M.D." — is limited
by the express language referring to his status of graduating from a particular
school and stating he is not in medical practice — the distinctions recognized
previously by the New York Court of Appeals in the 1992 case of |n re Rowe would
be applicable here. Under this analysis, the efforts of DOPL to distinguish the
application of limited commercial speech restrictions in the United States Supreme
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Court Ibanez opinion53 as being limited to only those who were professionally
licensed54 has no meaning because for journal article writing, Hodsen would not
have to be licensed.
Second, as it relates to use by Hodsen of a business card with his disclaimed
M.D. designation, the prohibition is overbroad. So long as any sale is done without
"diagnosis" being involved, Hodsen is exempt from licensure. When a sale is done
that includes "diagnosis" as outlined in this case, the language that brings Hodsen
within licensure regulation does not come from Hodsen; hence, no individual is
going to be misled by Hodsen's truthful and non-misleading speech in response to
the same.
Third, if DOPL agreed that the speech was not misleading as clarified, the
statute prohibits Hodsen from listing his M.D. degree without listing "of the branch
of the healing arts for which the person has a license."55 Such a requirement is an
absolute bar on Hodsen's listing of truthful and non-misleading information about
himself. This type of prior restraint is unlawful under both the Utah and United
States Constitution.

512 U.S. 316, 114 S.Ct. 2084, 129 LEd.2d 118 (1994).
DOPL Brief at 27-28.
U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(d).
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CONCLUSION
DOPL has been unable to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest
that would justify the prohibition on an exchange of information between Hodsen
and Anderson that is truthful and non-misleading. The prohibition infringes upon
the rights of Hodsen and Anderson to give and receive private and commercial
speech as well as Anderson's right to formulate religious belief and act on the
same, whether as an exercise of religious freedom or privacy to one's personal
autonomy and bodily integrity. Hodsen also has a right of private and commercial
speech to use the term "M.D." after his name with the suggested disclaimers to
ensure that no reasonable person is misled as to his licensure status with DOPL by
his use of the same.
DATED and EXECUTED this 11th day of August, 1999.

hitifjjUliifm
Matthew Hilton of Matthew Hilton, P.C.
Attorney for Hodsen and Anderson
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